How to Study International Relations from Zero: Puzzles, Levels, Power, and Perspectives

LESSON METADATA

Note on self-containment: Everything needed to master this lesson is inside this document. Where I cite an author, I summarize the argument fully enough that you do not need to read the original to complete the lesson. The “Further Reading” section at the end is optional deepening, not a requirement.

SECTION 0 — Why This Lesson Exists

Most people who “follow geopolitics” never learn to do it. They consume claims — NATO provoked Russia; China is debt-trapping Africa; Iran is irrational; the UN is useless — without the apparatus to test them. The result is a person who has opinions but no analytical capability, who can recite events but cannot explain them, and who mistakes fluency for understanding.

International Relations (IR) as a discipline exists to convert the chaos of world events into explainable, testable, and falsifiable claims. This lesson teaches you the four instruments that make that possible:

1. The puzzle — the discipline’s basic unit of inquiry. Before you can explain anything, you must know precisely what needs explaining.
2. Levels of analysis — the discipline’s answer to “where do causes live?”
3. Power — the discipline’s central concept, which is far more complex than “who has the bigger army.”
4. Perspective — the recognition that different traditions define puzzles, levels, and power differently, and that mature analysis reconstructs each before adjudicating among them.

By the end of this lesson, you will be able to take any geopolitical claim and do four things with it: identify the puzzle, locate the level of analysis, specify which concept of power is being used, and reconstruct how each of the five perspectives (African, Chinese, Russian, Western, UN) would frame it.

SECTION 1 — PRE-CLASS PRIMING

1.1 Diagnostic retrieval (answer before reading further)

This is the first lesson, so there is no prior course material to retrieve. Instead, answer these three questions from your current knowledge. Write your answers down — you will return to them at the end to see how your thinking has changed.

1. When you hear “international relations,” what do you think the subject is? One sentence.
2. Take the claim: “The 2023 Niger coup happened because of French neocolonialism.” What would you need to know to decide whether this is a good explanation or a bad one?
3. Take the claim: “Russia invaded Ukraine because NATO expanded eastward.” Is this an explanation, a justification, a prediction, or something else? Why?

Do not check anything. Write your honest answers. These are your baseline. At the end of the lesson, you will re-answer them and compare.

1.2 Orientation questions

Before you begin the lesson core, hold these questions in mind:

• Why is it that intelligent people disagree so profoundly about the same events?
• What makes one explanation of a war better than another?
• Can international politics be studied scientifically, or is it inherently interpretive?
• Whose knowledge counts as knowledge in IR?

SECTION 2 — LESSON CORE

2.1 Learning objectives

By the end of this lesson, you can:

1. Identify the puzzle in any geopolitical claim, distinguishing description, explanation, prediction, and prescription.
2. Locate any explanation at the individual, state, systemic, or transnational level of analysis, and explain what each level reveals and conceals.
3. Distinguish the three faces of power (decision-making, agenda-setting, preference-shaping) and the material, relational, and legitimate dimensions of power.
4. Reconstruct how the African, Chinese, Russian, Western, and UN traditions each define power and the international, and adjudicate among them on a specific case.
5. Build a complete IR explanation: puzzle → theory → mechanism → evidence → falsifiers → alternative explanations.

2.2 KEY IDEA 1 — IR is the study of puzzles, not events

The claim: An event is not a puzzle. A puzzle is a variation that needs explaining — a difference between what happened and what we would have expected, or a difference between two cases that look similar but turned out differently.

Mechanism: Why does this matter? Because without a puzzle, explanation has no target. If you ask “why did the war happen?”, the answer can be anything — human nature, capitalism, a mad leader, God’s will. If you ask “why did the war happen in 2022 and not in 2014, when the same structural conditions were present?”, you have a puzzle that disciplines your explanation.

How to construct a puzzle. Every good IR puzzle has one of three forms:

1. Variation over time: The same conditions produced different outcomes at different times. Example: Why did the Cold War end peacefully in 1989–91, but the transition from the Concert of Europe ended in the First World War in 1914?
2. Variation across cases: Similar cases produced different outcomes. Example: Why did decolonization in Ghana (1957) proceed peacefully, while in Algeria (1954–62) it produced a brutal war?
3. Puzzle against expectation: The outcome contradicts what a leading theory predicts. Example: Realism predicts that states balance against a rising hegemon. Why, then, have many African states deepened ties with China rather than balancing against it?

Scope condition: Puzzles are only as good as the theory that generates the expectation. A puzzle against realism is only a puzzle if realism is actually the right baseline. If realism never applied to the case, the “puzzle” is spurious.

Observable implication: A well-formed puzzle can be stated in one sentence beginning with “Why did X happen rather than Y?” or “Why did X happen when Y?” If your puzzle cannot be written in that form, it is probably a topic, not a puzzle.

The four things people confuse with explanation:

Critical skill: Most public discourse slides between these four without noticing. A person may state a prescription (“NATO should…”) while thinking they have given an explanation. Your first analytical discipline is to name which of the four you are doing at any moment.

2.3 KEY IDEA 2 — Causes live at different levels, and the level you choose determines what you can see

The claim: Every explanation of international politics locates its cause at one of four levels. The choice of level is not neutral — it determines what you will find, what you will miss, and what you will blame.

The four levels. The classic formulation is Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War (1959), which distinguished three “images” — the individual, the state, and the international system. J. David Singer (1961) formalized the “level-of-analysis problem.” Modern IR adds a fourth, the transnational. Here is the full apparatus:

Level 1 — The individual. Causes are located in the psychology, beliefs, personality, or pathology of leaders.

• Example: The invasion of Ukraine is explained by Putin’s personal historical grievances and fear of democratic contagion.
• What it reveals: The role of perception, misperception, ego, ideology, and decision-making pathology (e.g., the psychology of humiliation, the “operational code” of leaders, the groupthink of small decision units).
• What it conceals: Structural pressures that would have produced similar behavior from any leader in that position; the institutional constraints on leaders; the possibility that “mad” leaders are responding rationally to structural incentives.
• Diagnostic question: Would a different leader, facing the same structural conditions, have done the same thing?

Level 2 — The state. Causes are located in domestic institutions, regime type, bureaucratic politics, economic structure, or national identity.

• Example: The invasion is explained by Russia’s regime type — an authoritarian, personalist system in which no institution can restrain the leader, and in which nationalism is the legitimating ideology.
• What it reveals: The role of regime type (democracies vs. autocracies), bureaucratic competition (the military-industrial complex, the security services), domestic coalitions (oligarchs, nationalists), and identity construction.
• What it conceals: The system-level pressures that make certain state-level outcomes likely; the fact that states with very different domestic structures sometimes behave similarly.
• Diagnostic question: If you changed the domestic regime but kept the international position constant, would the outcome change?

Level 3 — The international system. Causes are located in the distribution of power, the structure of the international system (anarchy, polarity), or the state of the security dilemma.

• Example: The invasion is explained by the structure of the post-Cold War system — NATO’s expansion into Russia’s perceived sphere of influence, the security dilemma that this triggered, and the absence of any institution capable of mediating the conflict.
• What it reveals: The role of polarity (unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity), anarchy, relative gains, the security dilemma, and the balance of power.
• What it conceals: Why states in similar structural positions behave differently; the role of domestic politics; the role of norms and identities.
• Diagnostic question: If a different state occupied Russia’s structural position, would it behave the same way?

Level 4 — The transnational. Causes are located in forces that cross borders and are not reducible to any single state: capitalism, ideology, religion, ethnic networks, technology, climate, or epistemic communities.

• Example: The invasion is explained by the global crisis of the liberal order — the rise of authoritarian capitalism, the fragmentation of the post-1945 normative consensus, and the global competition between democratic and authoritarian models of modernity.
• What it reveals: The role of global capitalism, transnational ideology, technological change, climate stress, and non-state actors.
• What it conceals: The specific decisions and structures of particular states; the agency of leaders; the difference between global trends and particular outcomes.
• Diagnostic question: If you changed the global context but kept the state and system constant, would the outcome change?

The methodological rule: A complete explanation will usually involve all four levels, but it will specify which level does the analytical work — which level is doing the causal heavy lifting — and which levels are background conditions. The mistake is not using one level; the mistake is using one level unconsciously and mistaking it for the whole.

The practical technique: When you encounter an explanation, ask: at what level is the cause located? Then ask: what does this level hide? Then ask: what would the explanation look like if the cause were at a different level? This is called level-shifting, and it is the single most useful analytical habit in IR.

Worked illustration — the same event, four explanations:

None of these is simply “wrong.” Each is incomplete. The skill is to see which one an analyst is using, what it illuminates, and what it obscures — and then to build an explanation that combines them without collapsing into “everything matters.”

2.4 KEY IDEA 3 — Power has three faces, and IR’s central concept is contested

The claim: Power is not one thing. It has at least three faces — the ability to win decisions, the ability to keep issues off the agenda, and the ability to shape what others want — and it has three dimensions — material, relational, and legitimate. Different theoretical traditions define power differently, and the definition you adopt determines your entire analysis.

The three faces of power. This is the classic formulation from Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (1974), building on Robert Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz:

First face — decision-making power (Dahl). A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something B would not otherwise do. Example: The US persuades or coerces a state to vote a certain way in the UN Security Council. This is observable, measurable, and behavioral.

Second face — non-decision-making power (Bachrach and Baratz). A has power over B to the extent that A can keep certain issues off the agenda, so that B never even considers them. Example: The IMF’s structural adjustment conditions keep “nationalization of resources” off the policy agenda of borrowing states — not because it was voted down, but because it was never proposed. This is less observable, because the absence of a decision is harder to see than a decision.

Third face — preference-shaping power (Lukes). A has power over B to the extent that A can shape B’s wants — so that B comes to desire what A wants it to desire. Example: Decades of Western development discourse have shaped how African elites define “development” — as integration into global markets rather than as structural transformation or regional autonomy. B does not experience this as coercion; B experiences it as common sense.

The three dimensions of power. Alongside the three faces, IR distinguishes three dimensions of what power is:

1. Material power (capabilities): military forces, economic output, resources, technology, geography. This is the realist’s default — the “elements of national power.”
2. Relational power (network position): power that comes from occupying a strategic node in a network — financial centrality (the dollar system), supply-chain chokepoints (semiconductors), control of chokepoints (Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb). Farrell and Newman’s “weaponized interdependence” is a theory of relational power. A state with fewer material capabilities can exercise enormous power if it sits at a network chokepoint.
3. Legitimate power (authority): power that comes from being recognized as entitled to rule, define, or adjudicate. The UN Security Council’s authority rests not only on the P5’s military power but on the recognition of the Charter as legitimate. Legitimacy is a form of power that cannot be measured in divisions or GDP.

Why this matters for IR analysis: The claim “China is powerful” is meaningless without specifying: material power (yes, large), relational power (increasingly central in supply chains), or legitimate power (contested — its model of order is accepted by some states and rejected by others). The claim “Iran is weak” is similarly ambiguous: materially weak relative to the US, but relationally powerful in the Strait of Hormuz, and legitimate in the eyes of its regional allies. The concept of power is only useful when disaggregated.

Scope condition: The three faces and three dimensions are not always simultaneously operative. In a crisis, first-face material power dominates. In a long-term structural relationship, third-face and relational power dominate. The analyst must specify which face and dimension are doing the work in the case at hand.

Observable implications:

• If first-face power is operative, you should see explicit contests, votes, coercive threats, and observable compliance.
• If second-face power is operative, you should see systematic absence of certain issues from agendas, and you should be able to identify who benefits from that absence.
• If third-face power is operative, you should see convergence of preferences, “common sense” that serves one party’s interests, and the absence of coercion.

2.5 KEY IDEA 4 — The five perspectives define power and the international differently, and each is internally coherent

The claim: IR is not a neutral science with “perspectives” added on. The dominant Western tradition is itself a perspective. African, Chinese, Russian, and UN traditions each define the basic concepts — power, order, sovereignty, security — in ways that produce different puzzles, different levels of analysis, and different conclusions. The mature analyst can reconstruct each from within before adjudicating among them.

This section gives you each perspective’s core commitments in enough depth to use them.

2.5.1 The African perspective (primary)

Core commitments. African IR is not a single school, but its major strands share a foundational claim: the international system was constituted through colonial conquest and racial hierarchy, and that constitution persists. Key commitments:

• Sovereignty is hard-won and fragile. Non-interference is not a procedural nicety — it is a defense against re-colonization. The AU Constitutive Act enshrines sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference as foundational principles precisely because African states experienced the opposite.
• The state is not the only site of security governance. African political orders are characterized by hybridity — traditional authorities, religious networks, militias, and informal economies coexist with and sometimes displace the formal state. Theorizing security from this hybridity, rather than treating it as “state failure,” expands IR as a whole.
• Coloniality structures knowledge. Mainstream IR treats the Western experience of sovereignty and anarchy as universal. African scholarship (Grovogui, Mbembe, Danso and Aning) shows that this erases the hierarchical, racialized, and extractive foundations of the international system.
• Alternativity. African experiences are not “cases” to be fitted into Western theory. They are sources of alternative theoretical frameworks.

How this perspective defines power: Power is relational and structural — it includes the capacity to extract, to define, and to set the terms of engagement. A mining concession that transfers cobalt to a foreign firm at prices set elsewhere is an exercise of power, even if no gun is pointed. Power also includes the “weapons of the weak” — the ability to use external competition to extract concessions, to play suitors against each other, to convert weakness into leverage.

How it defines the international: A hierarchically structured system in which formal sovereignty coexists with substantive inequality. The relevant history is not Westphalia (1648) but Berlin (1884–85) and the long struggle for self-determination.

What it occludes: It can underplay the agency of African states themselves (treating them only as victims), and it can underplay the genuine differences among African states’ interests and strategies.

2.5.2 The Chinese perspective

Core commitments. The “Chinese School” is not a monolith, but its major branches share a rejection of the Western state-centric, anarchic ontology in favor of relationality, moral authority, and order as hierarchy:

• Relational theory (Qin Yaqing): International politics is constituted through relations and processes, not discrete rational actors. A state’s identity and interests emerge from its relationships, not prior to them.
• Tianxia (Zhao Tingyang): “All under heaven” frames world order as a hierarchical, harmonious whole, in which the legitimate ruler orders the world for the benefit of all — not a system of formally equal sovereigns.
• Moral realism (Yan Xuetong): Leadership and morality, not only material power, determine the rise and fall of states. A distinct normative strand within realism.
• Civilizational state: China is understood as a continuous civilization, not a nation-state. Sovereignty is civilizational, not merely territorial.

How this perspective defines power: Power is relational and moral. It includes the capacity to sustain relationships, to embody legitimacy, and to order hierarchies. Material power matters, but it is insufficient — leadership (in the Confucian sense of moral exemplarity) is the decisive variable in long-run competition.

How it defines the international: A relational order of differentiated statuses, not a flat system of equal sovereigns. The relevant history is civilizational continuity, not the Westphalian settlement.

What it occludes: It can underplay the coercive dimension of hierarchy; it can underestimate the agency of smaller states; it can naturalize China’s own position within the hierarchy it describes.

2.5.3 The Russian perspective

Core commitments. Russian official and intellectual discourse centers on multipolarity, sovereignty as great-power prerogative, and civilizational plurality:

• Multipolarity: The unipolar moment is over. A polycentric order is emerging in which several great powers, each with its own civilizational sphere, coexist.
• Stratified sovereignty: Sovereignty is not equal. Great powers are truly sovereign; smaller states fall into the spheres of influence of great powers. This is not a normative claim but a description of how the world actually works.
• State-civilization: Russia understands itself as a distinct civilization with a historical legacy and a mission to defend traditional values against universalist liberalism.
• Anti-hegemonic revisionism: The post-Cold War settlement is rejected as Western hegemony. The UN Security Council is accepted only insofar as the veto protects Russian interests.

How this perspective defines power: Power is the capacity to defend one’s civilizational sphere and to resist the imposition of external models. It is geopolitical, territorial, and cultural — not primarily economic or institutional.

How it defines the international: A permanent competition among civilizational blocs, in which spheres of influence are the natural form of order. The relevant history is the repeated invasion of Russia from the West, and the post-Cold War humiliation.

What it occludes: It can naturalize aggression against smaller neighbors; it can treat the preferences of those neighbors as irrelevant; it can underplay the genuine agency and identity of states within its claimed sphere.

2.5.4 The Western perspective

Core commitments. “Western” is not a single tradition either — it includes realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, and critical theory. But the dominant strands share:

• Anarchy as the organizing condition: There is no overarching authority above states, and order must be explained, not assumed.
• The state as the primary actor: Even when non-state actors matter, the state is the container of political authority.
• Rationality as the baseline: States are assumed to calculate costs and benefits, even if imperfectly.
• The possibility of progress: Liberal institutionalism in particular holds that cooperation, institutions, and norms can mitigate anarchy.

How this perspective defines power: Primarily material (capabilities) and relational (network position), with legitimacy as a secondary dimension. This is the tradition that produced the three faces and three dimensions you learned above.

How it defines the international: An anarchic system of sovereign states, structured by the distribution of power, in which institutions and norms can partially order cooperation. The relevant history is Westphalia (1648), the World Wars, and the post-1945 institutional settlement.

What it occludes: Its own historical particularity — the colonial foundations of the system it describes, the racial hierarchy that structured sovereignty, and the experience of the majority world. Western critical traditions (post-colonial, feminist, decolonial) are internal self-critiques of this perspective, not external ones.

2.5.5 The UN perspective

Core commitments. The UN is not a scholarly school but a normative-institutional discourse with distinctive features:

• The Charter as the frame: Sovereignty, non-interference, the prohibition on the use of force, and the peaceful settlement of disputes are the foundational norms.
• Multilateralism as method: Problems are to be addressed through the collective deliberation of member states, not unilateral action.
• Peace operations as practice: The UN’s operational identity is bound up with peacekeeping, which requires adaptable, inclusive, politically grounded missions.
• The gap between principle and practice: The UN’s normative commitments coexist with P5 veto politics and selective enforcement.

How this perspective defines power: Legitimate authority, grounded in the Charter and in the recognition of member states. The UN’s power is the power to define what is legal, what is legitimate, and what counts as a threat to international peace and security.

How it defines the international: A society of states governed by law, in which sovereignty and non-interference are the foundational rules, and in which multilateral institutions are the legitimate mechanism for collective action.

What it occludes: The P5’s veto politics, the selective enforcement of Charter norms, and the ways in which the UN’s own structure reproduces the power hierarchy it claims to transcend.

2.5.6 The comparison matrix

Here is the matrix you will use throughout the course. Fill it from memory first, then check against the text above:

2.6 WORKED EXAMPLE (I do)

The puzzle: In 2023, a military junta overthrew Niger’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. France — Niger’s former colonial power and a key security partner — was forced to withdraw its troops. The junta then deepened security ties with Russia (via the Africa Corps) and economic ties with China. Western analysts described this as “Russia and China exploiting instability.” Yet Niger’s junta enjoyed significant popular support at home, and neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso — which had undergone similar coups — formed an alliance with Niger.

The puzzle stated precisely: Why did Niger’s coup lead to the expulsion of a Western power and the deepening of ties with Russia and China, rather than to a restoration of the previous alignment?

Level of analysis: The analyst must specify which level does the analytical work. Let us walk through all four.

• Individual level: The junta leader, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, had personal grievances against Bazoum and a history of rivalry within the presidential guard. This explains who staged the coup, but not why the outcome — the realignment — followed. Individual-level explanation is necessary but insufficient.
• State level: Niger’s state was structurally weak, dependent on external security assistance (French and US troops, plus a large aid budget), and characterized by a rentier political economy (uranium extraction, foreign military bases). The coup revealed the fragility of the state’s monopoly on violence and the unpopularity of the elite’s dependence on France. This level does substantial work: it explains why the coup was popular and why the junta could mobilize anti-French sentiment.
• Systemic level: The post-Cold War security architecture in the Sahel had collapsed. French-led counterterrorism (Operation Barkhane) had failed to contain the insurgency; the US had a light footprint; the AU and ECOWAS had limited enforcement capacity. The systemic vacuum — the absence of a hegemon willing and able to restore order — created the space for realignment. This level explains why the realignment was possible, but not why it took the specific form it did.
• Transnational level: The global contest between Western liberal order and its rivals provided an ideological vocabulary and material resources. Russia’s Africa Corps offered security services without the conditionality that Western partners demanded. China offered infrastructure and mineral extraction without governance conditions. The transnational contest explains why the junta had alternatives — it did not have to accept French terms.

The explanation, synthesized: The coup was made possible by the collapse of the Sahel security architecture (systemic), made popular by the structural dependence and rentier character of the Nigerien state (state), made possible in its specific form by the availability of Russian and Chinese alternatives (transnational), and executed by a junta with its own internal dynamics (individual). The analytical work is done by the interaction of the state and systemic levels; the individual and transnational levels provide the form and the vocabulary.

Which perspective does this explanation privilege? It is a Western-style multi-level analysis — it uses the standard Western apparatus. Now let us reconstruct the same event from each perspective:

• African perspective: The coup is not primarily about Russia or China. It is about the legitimacy crisis of a post-colonial state whose elites were seen as serving foreign interests. The junta’s popularity reflects a long history of anti-colonial sentiment and the failure of the post-independence social contract. The “realignment” is a rational strategy of sovereignty assertion — using external competition to escape dependence on a single patron. The African perspective foregrounds agency and legitimacy, not external manipulation.
• Chinese perspective: The event illustrates the decline of Western hegemony and the emergence of a multipolar order in which African states exercise genuine choice. China’s engagement is developmental and non-interventionist; the “debt-trap” and “exploitation” narratives are Western projections. Relationally, China gains by being a reliable partner that does not impose political conditions.
• Russian perspective: The event confirms that the unipolar order is collapsing and that states are free to choose their civilizational partners. Russian security cooperation is a sovereign choice by Niger, not “exploitation.” The West’s expulsion is a consequence of its own arrogance and its refusal to treat African states as equals.
• Western perspective: The event is a symptom of the erosion of the liberal order in the Sahel. Russia and China are exploiting governance vacuums. The West’s withdrawal represents a strategic setback. The explanation focuses on the failure of Western policy and the need to compete more effectively — through better conditionality, more effective security assistance, and countering Russian disinformation.
• UN perspective: The event raises serious concerns about the unconstitutional change of government and the erosion of democratic norms. The UN condemns coups and calls for a return to constitutional order, while acknowledging the need to address the root causes of instability, including governance deficits and external interference. The Charter’s principles of sovereignty and non-interference are relevant to the question of external military presence.

The adjudication. Which perspective best explains the outcome? The African perspective captures something the Western perspective misses: the popular legitimacy of the junta’s anti-French posture and the structural roots of that sentiment. The Western perspective captures something the African perspective underplays: the material and security vacuum that made the realignment possible. The Chinese and Russian perspectives are partly justifications (theirs and the junta’s) rather than explanations, but they correctly identify the structural opening provided by multipolarity. The UN perspective captures the normative stakes but not the causal dynamics. A complete explanation combines the African and Western insights, uses the Chinese and Russian perspectives as evidence of how the actors themselves understand the event, and treats the UN perspective as a normative benchmark rather than a causal theory.

2.7 PROBLEM PAIR (We do)

Your task: Analyze the following case using the apparatus above. Write your analysis before reading the model answer.

The case: In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Western analysts explained the invasion as a product of Russian imperialism and Putin’s personal ambitions. Russian officials explained it as a response to NATO enlargement and the threat of Ukrainian membership in the alliance. African and Global South states largely refused to condemn Russia, citing sovereignty and non-interference, and some cited NATO’s own history of intervention.

Your tasks:

1. State the puzzle precisely in one sentence.
2. Identify the level of analysis used by each explanation.
3. Identify which face and dimension of power each explanation emphasizes.
4. Reconstruct the African perspective on the event. What does it foreground? What does it occlude?
5. Write a 300-word adjudication: which perspective best explains the global reaction to the invasion, as distinct from the invasion itself?

Model answer (compare after writing your own):

Puzzle: Why did Russia invade Ukraine in 2022, when the same structural conditions (NATO enlargement, Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian decline) had existed since at least 2008, without producing a full-scale invasion?

Levels:

• Western explanation: state level (Russian imperialism, Putin’s psychology) and systemic level (the security dilemma).
• Russian explanation: systemic level (NATO enlargement, security dilemma) with a normative claim about spheres of influence.
• African/Global South reaction: systemic and normative (sovereignty, non-interference) with an emphasis on the selectivity of Western norms.

Power:

• Western explanation emphasizes material power (Russian military) and the first face of power (coercion).
• Russian explanation emphasizes relational power (NATO’s network expansion) and the third face (the shaping of what counts as a “threat”).
• African reaction emphasizes legitimate power (the authority of sovereignty norms) and the second face (the agenda-setting power of the West in defining which violations matter).

African perspective reconstruction: The African reaction foregrounds the sovereignty norm — a state’s territorial integrity should not be violated, and this applies to Ukraine as it applied to African states. But it also foregrounds the selective application of this norm by the West — interventions in Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere were justified by the same powers that now condemn Russia. The African perspective does not endorse the invasion; it refuses the Western framing of the conflict as a simple morality tale. What it occludes: the specific character of Russian aggression and the genuine Ukrainian agency that the “great-power competition” framing can obscure.

Adjudication: The Western and Russian explanations both explain the invasion at the systemic level — they disagree on which side bears responsibility for the security dilemma. But neither explains the global reaction. The African perspective explains the global reaction better than either: most of the world did not see the invasion as a clash between good and evil, but as a clash between great powers in which the sovereignty norm was being selectively invoked. This does not mean the African perspective explains the invasion — it doesn’t. It explains why the invasion did not produce a unified global response. The lesson: different perspectives explain different things, and the analyst must specify what is being explained.

2.8 INDEPENDENT MEMO (You do)

Produce a one-page analytical memo (500–600 words) on the following case, using the four headings below. This is your independent application — do not consult the model answers.

Case: The 2024 collapse of the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal) and Iran’s subsequent withdrawal from the treaty, after the European parties failed to lift sanctions and the UN snapback mechanism was triggered.

Memo headings:

1. Mechanism: What causal process explains the collapse? Specify the level of analysis and the concept of power.
2. Perspective reconstruction: How would each of the five perspectives explain the collapse? (African, Chinese, Russian, Western, UN — one paragraph each, or a table.)
3. Historical analogue: What earlier case illuminates this dynamic? (e.g., the collapse of the League of Nations, the failure of the Concert of Europe, the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty.)
4. Falsifiers: What evidence would prove your explanation wrong? What would you need to observe to abandon it?

Self-check before proceeding: Does your memo distinguish description, explanation, prediction, and prescription? Does it specify a level of analysis? Does it specify which face and dimension of power are doing the work? Does it reconstruct each perspective from within, rather than caricaturing it?

2.9 HINGE QUESTION

Answer before proceeding. If you get it wrong, reread the relevant section.

A scholar argues: “The United States maintains global dominance not mainly through its military, but through the dollar’s centrality in global finance, which allows it to exclude adversaries from the global financial system.” Which concept of power is this scholar using?

• A) First-face material power
• B) Second-face agenda-setting power
• C) Third-face preference-shaping power
• D) Relational power (network centrality)

Answer: D. The dollar’s centrality is a network position — it is relational power in Farrell and Newman’s sense. It is not first-face (it is not a direct decision), not second-face (it is not primarily agenda-setting, though it has that effect), and not third-face (it does not primarily shape preferences). The confusion arises because relational power enables all three faces — but the concept being used is relational.

If you answered A: You are conflating material capabilities with network position. Reread Section 2.4. If you answered B: You are close — exclusion from SWIFT does shape agendas — but the primary mechanism is network centrality, not agenda-setting. If you answered C: You are describing a different mechanism (preference-shaping), which is not what the scholar is describing.

SECTION 2A — DATA LAB (30–45 minutes)

Purpose: Ground the lesson’s concepts in empirical work.

Task: Go to the ACLED database (or use the summary data provided below) and examine conflict events in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) from 2018 to 2024.

Provided summary data (simplified for this exercise):

Analysis questions:

1. Trend: What is the trend in each category? What does the data show about the relationship between Russian paramilitary presence and civilian harm?
2. Level of analysis: Does this data support a state-level explanation, a systemic explanation, or a transnational explanation of the Sahel crisis? Why?
3. Perspective: How would each of the five perspectives interpret this data? (African: external intervention and state fragility; Chinese: Western failure and the need for alternative security models; Russian: sovereign choice and effective counterterrorism; Western: Russian predation and governance failure; UN: civilian protection and accountability.)
4. Limitation: What does this data not tell you? What would you need to know to make a causal claim?

Rule: Complete this lab before writing your independent memo. Evidence precedes argument.

SECTION 3 — DUAL-CODED VISUAL ANCHOR

Task: Draw the following by hand. Do not generate it with a tool.

Visual 1: The levels of analysis. Draw four concentric circles or a four-layer pyramid. Label them: Individual (center), State, System, Transnational (outer). For each layer, write one example of a cause located at that level for the 2022 Ukraine invasion. Draw arrows between layers to show how causes at one level interact with causes at another.

Visual 2: The three faces of power. Draw three columns. For each face, write: the name (decision-making, non-decision-making, preference-shaping), the key theorist (Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes), one example, and one observable implication.

Visual 3: The perspective matrix. Draw a five-column table (African, Chinese, Russian, Western, UN) and three rows (definition of power, definition of the international, primary occlusion). Fill it from memory. Then check against Section 2.5.

SECTION 4 — CORNELL NOTES

Set up your notes in the following structure:

Rule: Cover the notes and answer the cue-column questions from memory. This is the retrieval engine.

SECTION 5 — FEYNMAN COMPRESSION

Step 1: Explain the lesson’s central claim to a smart non-specialist in 150–200 words, without using IR jargon. If you must use a term (e.g., “level of analysis,” “security dilemma”), define it in plain language.

Step 2: Mark every point where you hesitated, used a term you could not define, or skipped a causal step. These are your gaps.

Step 3: Reread only the sections corresponding to your gaps. Then rewrite the explanation.

Step 4: Produce one analogy. Then state where the analogy breaks down. (Example: “Levels of analysis are like zoom levels on a map — but unlike a map, the levels are not just different resolutions of the same reality; they are different causal stories about the same event.”)

SECTION 6 — SPACED-REPETITION FLASHCARDS

Produce 12–15 cards. Use the following types:

Tag each card: L1, method, theory, perspective, difficulty.

SECTION 7 — METACOGNITIVE CALIBRATION

7.1 Confidence audit

Before checking any answers, rate your confidence (0–100%) on each learning objective:

After completing the exercises, rate your accuracy on each. Calculate the gap.

7.2 Three-question debrief

1. What did I misunderstand? (Not “what did I miss,” but “what did I believe that was wrong?”)
2. What strategy produced the most learning in this lesson? (Retrieval? The worked example? The perspective reconstruction?)
3. What will I do differently in Lesson 2?

7.3 Error log

SECTION 8 — CHEATSHEET (Module 0)

Build the first entry of your Module 0 cheatsheet now.

SECTION 9 — REVIEW SCHEDULE

SECTION 10 — COMPLETION CHECKLIST

• Diagnostic retrieval answered (Section 1.1)
• Five learning objectives read and understood
• Four key ideas studied with mechanisms and scope conditions
• Perspective comparison matrix filled from memory, then checked
• Worked example studied and self-explained
• Problem pair attempted and compared to model answer
• Independent memo produced (500–600 words)
• Hinge question answered correctly (or reteaching completed)
• Data lab completed before independent memo
• Three dual-coded visuals drawn
• Cornell notes with cue column, source log, and summary
• Feynman explanation written, gaps identified, rewritten
• 12–15 flashcards created with tags
• Confidence audit and error-log entry
• Cheatsheet entry added
• R2 review scheduled

FURTHER READING (Optional — for deepening, not required)

If you wish to go deeper into the material of this lesson, the following are the original sources and extensions. You do not need them to complete the lesson.

• On levels of analysis: Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (1959), ch. 1–2; J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics (1961).
• On the three faces of power: Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (1974); Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power” (1957); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power” (1962).
• On relational power: Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence,” International Security (2019).
• On the African perspective: Siba Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africans (1996); Kwaku Danso and Kwesi Aning, “African Experiences and Alternativity in International Relations Theory” (2019); Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa (1989).
• On the Chinese perspective: Qin Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics (2018); Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia (2021); Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (2011).
• On the Russian perspective: Fyodor Lukyanov, “Russia’s Vision of a Multipolar World” (2023); Mikhail Komin and Jussi Laine, “Russia’s Vision of a Multipolar World and the Sovereign ‘State-Civilisation’” (2024); Vladimir Putin, Valdai Club speeches (2018–2023).
• On the UN perspective: UN Charter; Pact for the Future (2024); UN Secretary-General speeches on peace and security (2023–2025).
• On the Sahel case: ACLED data and analysis (2023–2025); International Crisis Group reports on the Sahel; UN Security Council debates on the Sahel.

End of Lesson 1. When you are ready, say “Next” and I will write Lesson 2 (International Law and Institutions Primer) in the same format.